In spring 2025, Canadian national pride in Quebec is a robust 78%, according to Statistics Canada. However, every provincial poll reveals that Quebecers could vote for a separatist PQ government in October 2026. Any attempt to divide the current Canadian nation would plunge Canada into a profound national crisis, triggering immediate social and economic turmoil. The potential for a separatist government in 2026 represents a significant shift in Canadian politics, posing complex challenges to the country's established economic and social structures. PQ leader Paul St. Pierre Plamondon promises Quebecers greater prosperity and opportunity if Quebec separates from the rest of the country. Still, most economists and social scientists argue that Quebec independence could shrink the Quebec GDP by at least 5%, increase Quebec’s consolidated public debt to 92% of the debt-to-GDP ratio, threaten current trade and military agreements, and prevent Quebec from receiving generous equalization payments from the Government of Canada. An unclear referendum question would likely trigger a profound identity crisis among Quebecers, given their strong and established attachment to Canada. Numerous books and studies conclude that a 'Yes' victory in the 1995 referendum would have plunged both federal and provincial camps into chaos, as both Prime Minister Chrétien and Premier Parizeau were poorly prepared and largely improvising throughout the campaign. Thus, despite the PQ’s promises of prosperity, a move toward separation in 2026 would result in an avoidable economic and social catastrophe for both Quebec and Canada. Nevertheless, proponents argue that full sovereignty is a necessary step for Quebec to gain the exclusive legislative and fiscal powers required to protect its unique linguistic identity and to better develop its economy.
To begin with, Ottawa could refuse that Quebec separate from Canada in the event of a "yes" victory. Canada’s territorial sovereignty lies within the federal jurisdiction. Quebec would need the support and agreement of the Government and Parliament of Canada to separate from the country. Quebec could not unilaterally declare its independence because this would not be legally binding on any federal government or foreign power. In sum, Quebec could not change the current structure of Canada without Ottawa’s approval. Besides, Quebec would not get any recognition as a new country from other countries without Ottawa’s approval. In 1998, New York Times journalist Anthony DePalma writes that the Supreme Court of Canada expects that the international community rejects an attempt from Quebec to secede unilaterally from Canada. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Ottawa would have a legal obligation to negotiate the terms of separation if a clear majority of Quebecers were to vote 'Yes' on a clear referendum question.
In addition, the economy of Quebec could shrink in the long run after Quebec’s independence. In 1991, Fraser Institute economist Patrick Grady concluded in a research paper that Quebec’s economy would shrink by at least 5 percent of the GDP in the long run. On the other hand, Léon Dion writes in the 1991 Economic Consequences of Quebec Sovereignty that we can expect a drop of 5% to 10% in the economic output. In short, an independent Quebec could face trade barriers with the Canadian common market and the rest of the world. In sum, separation would terminate Quebec’s participation in Canada’s existing trade treaties and this could isolate Quebec’s economy from former trade partners.
Moreover, an independent Quebec would no longer receive financial support through Canada’s equalization program, which Quebec deeply needs to sustain its social and health programs. In 2018, the Edmonton Journal reported that Quebec had received $221 billion in equalization payments since 1957, accounting for 51% of all equalization payments nationwide. Quebec receives $15 billion in equalization payments in 2025; this can pay for roughly 14 weeks of Quebec government healthcare spending. An independent Quebec would lose all equalization payments which would create a massive fiscal gap forcing Quebec to find alternative revenue or face drastic cuts to the programs Quebecers value most.
Likewise, an independent Quebec would be responsible for both its existing provincial debt and its negotiated share of Canada’s national debt. In 2014, McGill University economist Christopher Ragan writes in the Globe and Mail: “Quebec would end up assuming a similar amount of federal debt: $154 billion. This would increase its debt-to-GDP ratio to 92 percent. At that point, Quebec would be more indebted than France, Spain, and the United States, and just below the level in Italy. That’s a lot of debt.” This means that Quebec would have a hard time paying back its public debts, and this could be unsustainable for the new country to keep its economy afloat while paying back the public debt. Canada can easily pay back the public debt due to the diverse wealth of natural resources including oil, potash, car manufacturing, and energy. Nevertheless, Quebec does not have this wealth of resources beyond its hydroelectric energy sector
On the other hand, the Parti Quebecois calculated in 2023 that Quebec’s public debt of an independent Quebec would account to roughly $397 billion. The Parti Quebecois assumed that Quebec’s share of the federal debt was $185 billion. However, these figures were based on the ideal scenario calculated by the Parti Quebecois; therefore, the actual public debt of an independent Quebec could differ significantly if Quebec’s separation were to occur. In short, any complex divorce can trigger very dramatic consequences for both parties; therefore, an independent Quebec would have to go through very tough negotiations with Ottawa to reach an agreement on the division of assets and liabilities. Moreover, McGill University professor Daniel Beland argues that these numbers were released by the Parti Quebecois to satisfy the PQ’s political base; hence, they may not reflect the true financial reality of an independent Quebec.
As well, the Parti Quebecois has never fully calculated the cost of the establishing new institutions and departments like an army, central bank, a diplomatic corps for foreign affairs, agencies for nuclear inspections and environmental oversight, etc. There has never been any estimate of how much an independent Quebec would need to spend on defence, foreign affairs, unemployment insurance, nuclear inspection, new environmental responsibilities, new national policing responsibilities, new individual transfer payments, drug and food administration, food inspection, etc. In reality, the Parti Quebecois has never produced a comprehensive cost assessment audited by independent economists regarding the establishment of a separated Quebec. The Parti Quebecois’s financial frameworks for an independent state were primarily produced to satisfy its political base rather than to provide a neutral economic forecast. Furthermore, these projections have not been scrutinized by a team of renowned, independent economists, largely because of the immense complexity involved in calculating the true cost of establishing a new sovereign state.
Therefore, an independent Quebec would need to ensure its territorial integrity and security by building a strong military force that can rival foreign threats. For that reason, the Parti Quebecois has a plan to build a small military force to be able to provide some military protection to a new country of Quebec and to apply to NATO membership. In 2023, the Parti Quebecois reveals that an independent Quebec would have about 8,000 soldiers within its armed forces. Paul St. Pierre Plamondon reveals that an independent Quebec will want to be a player in NATO, like other smaller countries such as Slovenia and Estonia. In the past, the PQ has favoured a non-aggression peacekeeping-style army with about 8,000 soldiers; St-Pierre Plamondon said the details will be discussed by PQ members at a policy convention.
Likewise, an independent Quebec would no longer be under NATO protection because Canada is a NATO member, not a sovereign Quebec. The new nation would have to apply for NATO membership. Quebec meets several NATO criteria, like having a real democratic system and having a strong economy. However, an independent Quebec will not have an army in the first years of independence, which is one of the criteria to meet to become a NATO member. Every country invited by NATO must have a functional army, which will take years and huge financial investments for Quebec to develop. During the 2014 Scottish referendum debate, Spain considered that if Scotland leaves the U.K., it would veto any Scottish membership due to concerns about its own regional movements; therefore, Spain could similarly block Quebec’s application to avoid setting a precedent for its own regional separatist movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country.
Nevertheless, an independent Quebec will no longer be part of Canada’s trade treaties like the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement, the Canada-European Union trade deal, and other trade agreements signed by the Government of Canada. In 1977, the Carter administration defined America’s stand on Quebec’s separation as follows: the United States will not intervene in Canada’s internal affairs, the U.S. will not get involved in Canada’s constitutional debate, the U.S. views a united Canada as a valued and strong partner, and the U.S. will respect Canada’s decision regarding their political future. U.S. President Jimmy Carter told Canadian reporters that “the stability there in Canada is of crucial importance to us… and the confederation itself is obviously of importance to us.” Thus, President Carter strongly believed that Canadians should not divide Canada into two parts, but they should work together to keep stability. In 1989, a U.S. declassified document revealed that Washington considered that Quebec would be an important economic partner and a responsible member of the family of nations. However, most U.S. statements on Quebec’s independence suggest that the U.S. preferred a strong and united Canada rather than having a divided Canada. Still, Quebec could face more trade tariffs in the first years of independence than it does within Canada. They will have to negotiate for many years trade deals with the U.S., Canada, Mexico, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Asian nations.
In sum, the Quebec independence project necessitates a clear and comprehensive plan that upholds both democracy and the rule of law while demonstrably ensuring the project's economic viability. Nevertheless, the Parti Quebecois and Bloc Quebecois did not have a very clear and well-planned strategy for the implementation of Quebec’s independence in case the Yes side would have won in 1995. Chantal Hebert and Jean Lapierre interviewed all of the 1995 Independentist top strategists, and they found out that there was a power struggle between Lucien Bouchard and Mario Dumont to prevent Jacques Parizeau from declaring a unilateral declaration of independence. Under Canadian and international law, a UDI would have no legal grounds, and this would have triggered a constitutional crisis. Stock markets would have plunged, and investors would have withdrawn funds due to the fear of political and legal mayhem. Still, Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau had a very clear goal: to negotiate with Ottawa and to separate the province 12 months after the referendum. However, Bloc Quebecois Leader Lucien Bouchard and ADQ Leader Mario Dumont did not support Parizeau’s strategy, and they wanted clarity when it comes to the future of Quebec. In sum, the Yes side leadership was made of different leaders with different views and ambitions for the province.
Nevertheless, the “No” camp lacked a clear vision for the aftermath of a “Yes” victory. In sum, the federal government was largely unprepared for such an outcome. in 1995. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien would have faced significant challenges to his leadership if he would have lost the referendum. There was a power struggle organizing to replace him with an English Canadian head of government. Jean Chrétien would have needed to intervene quickly to ensure the legitimacy of his leadership. In 2025, he told CBC Radio Canada that he could have triggered a federal referendum asking Quebecers a clear question on independence. Prime Minister Chrétien criticized the ambiguity of the question, and a second referendum could have ensured the federal government knows the true will of Quebecers. Chrétien viewed referenda more as negotiating tactics for constitutional reform than as definitive mandates for independence. Jean Chrétien would not have negotiated with the Parizeau government; this would have led to a constitutional crisis and to another referendum followed by legal disputes between the federal and the provincial government of Quebec.
Finally, the Parti Quebecois lost the two referenda because they did not have a strong social and economic plan for an independent Quebec. The party has always ignored the high and potentially unsustainable price Quebecers would have had to pay for separation. Evidence suggests the 1995 government was not fully prepared for the logistical realities of secession. Economists warn that the new sovereign state would be heavily indebted, with an economy potentially shrinking by 5%. Furthermore, separatism creates social instability in Quebec by dividing different social groups. For example, the separatist movement in the 1970s and 1980s prompted 600,000 English Quebecers to leave the province due to political instability and the rise to power of the Parti Quebecois. Ultimately, an independent Quebec would face the loss of federal transfers, increased public debt, economic disruption, a crisis of confidence, and emigration. In summary, the Parti Quebec needs a robust plan to address these challenges. If the Parti Quebecois wants to convince Quebecers on the benefits of Quebec’s independence, they need to provide a comprehensive financial plan audited by renowned economists regarding the true costs of separation. They need to provide solid evidence that Quebec needs full sovereignty for its social and economic development and demonstrate that the benefits of independence outweigh the costs of separation.
December 26, 2025